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1. Introduction
This chapter describes a privacy-secure digital watermarking scheme for fair content trading
against cybercrime on digital content piracy and privacy leakage. Conventional digital
watermarking schemes are effective only for providers since privacy of a client is not
concerned though content is protected. Provider’s security as well as client’s security need
to be considered to enhance security level of privacy management. Blind and Pseudo-blind
watermarking schemes utilizing encryption and media processing respectively are the
solutions to protect client’s security.
In conventional digital watermarking, embedding and extracting are carried out by the same
providers. Therefore, a malicious provider could provide fake extracted results to a client.
Verification result is considered as trustworthy evidence under the assumption that a provider
is trustworthy since most of the providers were owned by enterprises which has relatively
high social credibility. However, anyone is able to become a provider these days along with
development of technologies. Therefore, improper providers which have insufficient level of
knowledge or skill would manage client’s privacy information. In other words, a user has to
own his/her risk on the privacy information.
Privacy secure watermarking techniques, blind watermarking (Iwamura et al., 1997; Okada
et al., 2008) and pseudo-blind watermarking (Okada et al., 2009) are able to protect both
content and privacy for the sake of both providers and clients. Blind watermarking based
on cryptography and watermarking blinds up content by encryption against a provider to
conceal content information. However, the downside is incompatibility of cryptography and
watermarking in terms of robustness of watermark and processing cost of cryptography.
Pseudo-blind watermarking is another approach that uses media processing to blinds up
content instead of using cryptography which enhances compatible with watermarking.
The pseudo-blind watermarking provides better performance in robustness and processing
cost potentially since media process is compatible to watermarking. The technical detail,
features, performance evaluations of both schemes are described in this chapter based on our
experimental results.
1.1 History of digital content
Analog content has been alternatively replaced by digital content such as picture, music,
movie and book. Analog and digital has completely different features. For example, in
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analog content such as painting on a canvas, only similar replica or picture which is obviously
different from the original piece can be generated instead of making perfect copy. Alteration
of content is also easily identified from the original one. On the other hand, digital content can
be easily duplicated without any degeneration. Analog content is recorded on physical media
while digital content is only data which can be output by a monitor or speaker. Therefore,
digital content can be easily distributed to thousands of people at once through the Internet.
The features of digital content, easiness of duplication, alteration and distribution are practical
in terms of productivity. For instance, manufacturing and delivering movie through the
Internet is much easier and inexpensive than distributing packaged DVD sold in retail stores.
Clients also get benefit because they don’t have to go to the store, confirm stocks and almost
no space is needed to store the purchased content. However, digitalizing content involves
many issues regarding to illegal use such as piracy.
In addition to content protection, privacy of a purchaser also needs to be considered.
Purchasers (clients) are able to purchase analog content without exposing privacy such as
who bought what kinds of content if payment is made by cash. However, purchasing content
through the Internet requires user registration containing privacy information which may
involve privacy leakage.
1.2 Risk of digital content piracy
Recently, with a rapid development of IT infrastructure, all kinds of digital content can be
purchased through the Internet such as music, image, movie, and book as shown in Fig.1.
However, an enormous amount of digital content might have been pirated since they can
be easily duplicated and distributed through the Internet. In fact, an amount of distributed
analog audio content such as CD was peaked out in 1998 toward decreasing as shown in Fig.2
where quantities of distributed content is shown. Note that bars labeled as “CD” in the figure
show the amount of CD sold in the store while the other bars show amount of digital music
data based on downloaded counting. Decreasing may be because of illegal file sharing using
file sharing applications. Napster which had been used to share music content might have
been accelerated piracy in 1999. After that, P2P applications such as WinMX Winny and Cabos
had been alternatively used for illegal file sharing. Increasing online distribution of music
content indicates importance of content protection against piracy of audio data. Because of
the property of digital content, much unintentional crime might have been occurring. For
example, many people share files illegally using P2P applications without conscious of guilty.
Cryptography or information hiding is digital content protection techniques against piracy.
Cryptography encrypts entire content to protect content, but it will be exposed as no
protection when decrypted. For example, movie delivered by CATV is encoded by scrambling
and then a set top box decodes the encrypted content to play the content. The content is secure
as long as encrypted, but once it is decrypted, it would be exposed as no protection (Fig. 3).
Another effective protection technique is digital watermarking that makes some secret data
concealed in content. The hidden information, watermark is used for copyright protection,
tamper detection, covert communication, source tracking of leakage, and so forth. The ideal
form of watermark for copyright claiming is the one in which watermark should not be
removed by any manipulations, the watermarked content (endorsed content) should not be
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Fig. 1. Distribution Amount of Digital Content
Fig. 2. Distribution Amount on Analog Music Content
Fig. 3. Protection Techniques
degenerated by embedding watermark and embedded watermark should not perceptually
appear.
Two significant issues in the conventional watermarking schemes need to be considered, that
is, the provider’s security as well as client’s security needs to be considered for secure content
trading. The issues are fairness and privacy of a client on content trading.
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The demand to protect privacy information of client is increasing along with the increment of
privacy leakage. Moreover, in a conventional watermarking scheme, a client can be excused
from the responsibility of piracy as long as information leakage is technically possible by
a provider since the provider also possesses the same delivered watermarked content. In
order to resolve the problem, a fair and privacy-secure content trading framework needs to be
urgently provided.
2. Content protection techniques
Protection techniques, cryptosystems and information hiding techniques are introduced in
this section.
2.1 Cryptosystems
Cryptography protects content entirely by encryption. The content is secure as long as it
is encrypted, but once decrypted, the content would be insecure. Cryptography is mainly
classified as common key encryption and public key encryption. The former one uses the same
key for encryption and decryption in which calculation cost is low, but insecure since the key is
exposed when delivering it to a reviver. The latter one uses different keys for encryption and
decryption respectively. An encryption key cannot be used for description which enhances
security and usability. For example, assume Alice (sender) encrypts data, and Bob (receiver)
decrypts it. In the common key encryption, Bob must deliver the encryption key to Alice in
a strictly secure method. In other words, a key may be tapped by malicious party during the
delivering process. In public key encryption, Bob prepares a pair of public key and secret
key which are used for encryption and decryption respectively. Alice uses the public key
obtained from Bob to encrypt data and then deliver the encrypted data to Bob. Bob decrypts
the encrypted data using the secret key. The public key for encryption cannot be used for
decryption and a secret key for decryption is only possessed by Bob. Hence, even though the
encryption key is tapped, ciphertext cannot be decrypted.
2.1.1 Public key encryption
A public key cryptography such as RSA and El Gamal is originally proposed in 1976 by Diffie
and Hellman. It has advantage in usability, but processing cost is heavy compare to the
common key encryption. El Gamal (El Gamal, 1985) and Paillier encryption (Paillier, 1999)
which can be adapted to the watermarking schemes are described.
2.1.1.1 El Gamal encryption
El Gamal is proposed in 1982 by El Gamal in which the security relays on the difficulty of the
discrete logarithms problem. The asymmetric watermarking (Okada et al., 2008), related work
of blind watermarking (Iwamura et al., 1997) uses the modified El Gamal which is customized
version of El Gamal. The detail is described below.
STEP 1:(Preliminary) Bob generates a large prime number p and then finds generator g.
Multiplicative group of order q on Z∗p is also figured out. Next, determine x ∈ Zp and
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then calculates y = gx mod p where{
x secret key,
y, g, p public key.
The public key needs to be shared in prior to trading.
STEP 2:(Encryption) Alice generates ciphertext E(m) = (c, d) by generating a random
number r ∈u Zq and then encrypts the message m using the public key as{
c = gmyr mod p,
d = gr,
and then sends the ciphertext to Bob.
STEP 3:(Decryption) Bob decrypts ciphertext (c, d) received by Alice using the secret key x
as
gm = D(c, d) = c/dx mod p
to obtain m.
2.1.1.2 Paillier encryption
Paillier encryption (Paillier, 1999) is another homomorphic encryption which can be used with
watermarking. In a key generation phase, two large prime numbers p, q are generated. g ∈
ZN2 is selected such that gcd(L(g
λ mod N2), N) = 1 where N = pq, λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1).
Note that a public key is g, N and a private key is p, q. For the encryption phase, let m be
plaintext to be encrypted, r be a random number chosen from ZN , and E(·) be an encryption
function defined by
e = E(m) = gmrN mod N2. (1)
For decryption phase, the decrypted ciphertext m′ is obtained by
m′ = D(e) = L(e
λ mod N2)
L(gλ mod N2)
mod N (2)
where L(t) = (t− 1)/N and D(·) is decryption function.
The modified El Gamal and Paillier cryptography satisfy both an additive homomorphism
and an indistinguishability denoted by IND 1 which are requirement to be utilized with
watermarking. IND is necessary since the only three kinds of plaintexts (−1, 0, 1) would
be encrypted in an asymmetric watermarking protocol. Otherwise, the plaintexts can be
identified from the ciphertext. The relationship between public-key algorithms and their
properties are shown in Table 1.
2.2 Information hiding
Information hiding, in particular watermark has been used for verification in which banknotes
are embedded such as the one in paper currency. Watermark can be extracted by anyone,
1 A cryptosystem is secure in terms of indistinguishability if a ciphertext of given randomly chosen
message m0 or m1 cannot be identified by any adversary.
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Cryptography Homomorphism IND Computation Cost
Modified El Gamal additive, (multiplicative) YES low
Paillier (Paillier, 1999) additive YES high
Okamoto- Uchiyama (Okamoto et al., 1998) additive YES high
RSA multiplicative NO low
Table 1. List of Public-key Algorithms
but difficult to regenerate it. Information hiding had been used for covert communication
techniques such as military, diplomacy, spy and so forth that enable to conceal the existence of
confidential communication. For example, a sender uses special ink to embed invisible secret
message in blank space in the letter which disappears after a certain amount of time to ensure
security. The secret message can be extracted only by an authorized receiver who has special
liquid. This conceals existence of communication to the others.
Information hiding in digital format embeds secret message in digital content such as images,
music, movies, text and so forth. The message is embedded by adding noise-like signals in
content. Since the signals are so weak, only a watermark extraction program can recognize it.
Basic watermarking models and features are summarized in Fig. 4.
Fig. 4. Classification of Security Techniques
2.2.1 Digital image
Before we get into the watermarking technique, we overview a digital image which is
composed of a huge number of small dots called “pixels” standing for a picture cell. These
dots represent brightness to form an image. The brightness of Red, Green and Blue known as
the three primal colors represents colors of an image. For example, Lenna shown in Fig. 25 is
composed of 512× 512 dots in column and row respectively and 8-bit, 256 levels of brightness.
An index color image such as TIFF or GIF uses less color valuation for smaller data size
than full color images. Therefore, they are mostly used for website where quick response is
required. Gray-scale images composed of single color valuation, black-white is smaller in file
size which are used for surveillance cameras where color information is not needed. Binary
images represented in either black or white are used for copy machines and FAX because they
were not capable of processing color information when they were invented.
2.2.2 Frequency domain
In this section, we describe frequency which is indispensable on compression for multimedia
data. Frequency is very familiar term for audio data. Image can be also represented in
130 Applied Cryptography and Network Security
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frequency component. For example, hair parts in Lenna which are considered as complicated
area contains high frequency component while flat area such as skin area contains low
frequency components.
Multimedia data is often compressed by using frequency component since complicated area
where information omitting is hardly recognized can be effectively selected. For example,
little noise in hard and noisy parts in music is hardly recognized. Compression formats in
images are JPEG, GIF and TIFF. In audio, MP3 and WAV and in movie, MPEG2, MPEG4 and
MKV are the major ones.
Frequency domain is more effective for watermark to be embedded because the one
embedded in spatial domain somewhat damaged when compressed. However, watermark
is hardly influenced if embedded in frequency domain.
An example of watermark embedding process is briefly described below as shown in Fig.5.
Following descriptions show rough embedding techniques in spatial domain using x, y
coordinates. Watermark is embedded by modifying brightness in either odd or even number.
For example, if ω = 0, the value would be changed to odd number. Otherwise, it would
be changed to even numbers. Small change in brightness is perceptually unnoticeable. This
method is fragile against manipulations, but embedding in frequency domain provides more
robust watermark.
Fig. 5. An Example of Watermark Embedding Procedure
2.2.3 Digital watermark scheme
Digital watermark protects digital content by embedding imperceptive message such as
serial numbers, a client ID and copyright notice into the content. The watermark is hardly
removed from the watermarked content. If the pirated content had been found, the provider
would extract the message to claim the copyright. Watermark is required to be imperceptive
and robust against manipulation attacks which is in trade off because embedding robust
watermark causes more degradation. If imperceptiveness is increased, watermark becomes
fragile.
2.2.4 Potential attacks
Watermark could be removed by manipulations such as compression, re-sizing, rotation and
so forth. Stirmark Benchmark Tool is a common benchmark tool for robustness of watermark.
Stirmark applies various manipulations to a watermarked image based on media processing
131rivacy-Secure Digital W termarki  for Fair Content Trading
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and then output attacked images. Robustness is verified by extracting watermark from those
attacked images. Alternatively, this tool is called “Dewatermarker” indicating watermark
remover. Stirmark covers all major attacks as shown in Table 2.
Methods Detail
EmbedTime Overwrite watermark
AddNoise Noise addition
JPEG JPEG compression
MedianCut Smoothing without change of size and channel
ConvFilter Modification of low-pass, sharpness, histogram
RemoveLines Remove lines in vertical and horizontal
Cropping Crop a part of an image
Rescale Re-scaling
Rotation Rotating
Affine Twisting an image horizontally and vertically
Table 2. Attacks in StirMark Benchmark Tools
2.2.5 Tamper detection using fragile digital watermark
Fragile watermark is used for integrity check. If watermark had been damaged, it would
indicate that noise or alteration had been added to the watermarked content. Cropping
detection techniques based on fragile watermark (Lin et al., 2000) has been proposed in which
alternated area can be detected if watermark extracting is failed from the area.
2.2.6 Steganography
Steganography is used for covert communication by hiding message in the dummy content
as watermark. For example, assume Alice wants to send strictly confidential message to Bob.
Alice embeds very fragile watermark to dummy content. If the content had been attempted
to extract watermark while sending, the watermark must be disappear to protect message. In
this method, increasing message (watermark) length without degeneration is required.
2.2.7 Digital fingerprinting
In a fingerprinting technique, a provider embeds a unique client ID for every client. If pirated
content had been found, a provider would extract watermark from the content to track the
source. This deters illegal re-distribution or unintentional leakage. In this technique, only few
message for a user ID needs to be embedded robustly against manipulations.
2.3 Extended version of watermarking
2.3.1 Statistical watermarking
Patchwork watermarking (Bender et al., 1995), one of the statistical watermarking, embeds
message in statistical value of contents. In this method, an embedding key is a seed of
pseudo-random process which chooses a large number of pairs of pixels. Brightness values
in the pairs are made slightly brighter and darker for all pairs. Conceptually, the contrast
between pixels of the pairs encodes some secret information.
132 Applied Cryptography and Network Security
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Fig. 6. Distributions of Differences (ai − bi) and (a′i − b′i)
The extraction is carried out by finding the same pairs of the pixels chosen in the embedding
process and analyzing the difference of their brightness values for all pairs. This provides
invisible watermark that has a higher degree of robustness against attacks and image
manipulations.
A single-bit embedding process of patchwork watermark is described below. First, choose a
large number of pairs from an original image I and then obtain difference in each pair. Let a, b
be the first and second pixel of a pair, and Sn be the sum of (ai − bi) for n pairs, i.e.,
Sn =
n
∑
i=1
(ai − bi).
Let S¯n be an expected value defined by S¯n = Sn/n. Note that S¯n approaches 0 as n increases,
lim
n→∞ S¯n → 0. (3)
A distribution of differences in Lenna (256 × 256 pixels, 256 gray scale levels) with n = 10000
is shown in Fig. 6 (“Original Image”). At this experiment, a statistical value of an original
image would be S¯n = 0.0121, that satisfies the condition (3).
An embedding process, hiding a secret message ω into I is described. First, choose a seed
of pseudo-random sequence to assign two pixels (ai, bi) for n pairs. Next, to generate an
embedded image I ′, we modify the assigned pixels as, a′i = ai + δ, and b
′
i = bi − δ, for
i = 1, . . . , n, where δ is a constant that governs robustness of the watermark. Note that the
expected value S¯n
′
, an average of sum of the difference of the embedded image I ′, approaches
2δ as
S¯n
′
=
1
n
n
∑
i=1
(ai + δ)− (bi − δ) =
1
n
n
∑
i=1
(ai − bi) + 2δ = 2δ. (4)
with the parameter of δ = 20, the distribution of (a′i − b′i) is shifted 40 to right as illustrated in
Fig. 6. Hence, as δ goes larger, accuracy of detection increases, and as δ goes smaller, the risk
of a false detection increases. To extract the hidden message ω, choose a′i , and b
′
i according to
133rivacy-Secure Digital W termarki  for Fair Content Trading
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the random numbers, and then determine,
ω =
{
0 S¯n
′
< τ,
1 S¯n
′ ≥ τ, (5)
where τ is a threshold. The optimal threshold is given as τ = δ to equalize the false positive
and false negative. In the sample image Lenna, statistical value is S¯n
′
= 40.0158, which satisfies
the condition of S¯n ≥ τ = δ = 20.
3. Secure watermarking technique
Consideration of purchaser’s privacy is another important issue for fair and secure content
trading. Blind and Pseudo blind schemes are solutions to enhance the privacy protection.
The big picture of the secure content trading based on three-way communication by
interposing TTP (trusted third party) are introduced below (Fig. 7) which are non-blind, blind,
pseudo-blind watermarking techniques (Table 3).
The information to be protected is privacy of a client such as who purchased what kind of
content. Even though, TTP is trustworthy, there is demand that a client doesn’t want to expose
privacy information.
Fig. 7. Big Picture of Secure Content Protection Techniques
3.1 Non-blind watermarking
TTP is interposed for watermark embedding and pseudonymous user verification which is
the simplest way to protect privacy against a provider (Fig. 8). However, this scheme doesn’t
fulfill the needs since content is exposed to TTP. A client doesn’t want to expose unnecessary
information to TTP even though TTP is trustworthy.
Fig. 8. Non-blind Watermarking
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3.2 Blind watermarking, combination of homomorphic encryption and watermark
Blind watermarking blinds up content by encryption against TTP. In this scheme, watermark
is able to be embedded even though the content is encrypted. Therefore, TTP cannot
obtain information of content. However, it is inefficient in terms of watermark strength and
processing cost.
Fig. 9. Blind Watermarking
3.3 Pseudo-blind watermarking, combination of media processing and watermark
Pseudo-blind watermarking (Okada et al., 2009) is an alternative method of blind
watermarking which is as secure as blind watermarking and as practical as a non-blind
watermarking. The pseudo-blind watermarking partially scrambles the content so that
content is blinded against TTP. At the same time, watermark is well embedded since
scrambling is designed to preserve feature of the content such as edge of recoded subject
where watermark is embedded. Hence the embedded watermark has sufficient level of
robustness. A prototype of a content trading system based on the pseudo-blind method has
been designed and implemented, and the performance of the pseudo-blind watermarking is
evaluated on the system.
The scheme is briefly described below (Fig.10). In prior to trading, a client obtains a
pseudonymous ID from TTP. The client requests content by using the ID. If verified, the
provider decomposes requested content into two pieces. One of which is blinded by media
processing which contains sufficient amount of image feature. Another one is the counterpart.
The former one is sent to TTP for watermark embedding and latter one is delivered to
the client. At this point, the provider has no information to profile a client because of
pseudonymity. Next, TTP embeds watermark into blinded piece (endorse piece) and then
delivered to the client. At this point, TTP has no clue as to what kind of content has been
traded due to blindness. Finally, the client integrates those decomposed pieces to obtain
complete endorsed image. Hence, the client can obtain a complete endorsed image without
exposing the privacy information.
4. Verification and performance evaluation
4.1 Performance summary of blind method
Asymmetric watermarking (Pfitzmann et al., 1996) is one of the related works of blind
watermarking. Fundamental problems of the blind schemes are specified with our
135rivacy-Secure Digital W termarki  for Fair Content Trading
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Fig. 10. Pseudo-blind Watermarking
Non-blind Blind Pseudo-blind
Compatibility of
watermark and
blinding method
applicable to
any watermark
algorithms
applicable to
certain watermark
algorithms
applicable to
any watermark
algorithms
Privacy against TTP No protection Blinded by
encryption
Blinded by
Media processing
(scrambling)
Watermark strength Robust Fragile Robust
Table 3. Comparison of Three-way Communication Content Trading
implemented results (Okada et al., 2008) that uses El Gamal encryption and patchwork
watermarking.
Suppose that, a provider embeds watermark into content, a client verifies watermark, and TTP
generates a secret key sk and public key pk for the modified El Gamal encryption. Not only
does interposal of TTP enhances the reliability of verification, but also prevents a provider
from cheating a client. Note that TTP needn’t to be fully trustworthy since it does not obtain
the embedding key, which is the index of modified pixels determined by a client throughout
the embedding process.
Let I = (x1, . . . , xℓ) be an original image, I
′ = (z1, . . . , zℓ) be an embedded image, and ℓ be the
number of pixels in I and I ′. An asymmetric watermarking scheme is illustrated in Fig. 11.
4.1.1 The asymmetric protocol
TTP generates the modified El Gamal public key, y = gx mod p, where a secret key is x. Let
EXT be conversion function in the second step, and IDENTIFY be a function to obtain ω at the
final step, respectively.
STEP1:(Embedding) A client generates random numbers by giving a seed to pseudo-random
generator, and obtains subsets A and B of set of indexes {1, 2, . . . , ℓ} such that A ∩ B = φ
and |A| = |B| = n. The client chooses δ and modifies pixels according to (A, B) in the
image I to generate I ′ as
zi =
⎧⎨

xi + δ if i ∈ A,
xi − δ if i ∈ B,
xi otherwise,
(6)
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Fig. 11. The Model of the Asymmetric Digital Watermarking
for i = 1, ..., ℓ. A client computes e, a ciphertext of (A, B) as e = (c1, . . . , cℓ, d1, . . . , dℓ),
where ci = g
mi yri , di = g
ri mod p,
mi =
⎧⎨

1 if i ∈ A,
−1 if i ∈ B,
0 otherwise,
(7)
and ri is random numbers of Zq, for i = 1, . . . , ℓ. Finally, a client sends I
′ = (z1, . . . , zℓ) to
the provider in conjunction with encrypted indexes e = (c1, . . . , cℓ, d1, . . . , dℓ).
STEP2:(Extracting) The provider computes ciphertext e′ =EXT(I ′, e) = (C, D) as follow;
C = cz11 c
z2
2 · · · czℓℓ =
ℓ
∏
i=1
gmizi yrizi = g∑
ℓ mizi y∑
ℓ rizi = gSn yR, (8)
D = dz11 d
z2
2 · · · dzℓℓ =
ℓ
∏
i=1
grizi = gR,
where R = ∑ℓi=1 rizi mod q, and Sn is the sum of difference in patchwork watermark
scheme, i.e., Sn = 2nδ and then sends e′ to TTP.
STEP3:(Decrypting) TTP uses its private key x to decrypt e′ = (C, D) as M = D(e′) =
C/Dx = gSn and then sends back the decrypted text M to the provider.
STEP4:(Identifying) The provider identifies exponent h of M as IDENTIFY(M) such that
M = gh by testing all possible h = 1, 2, . . . , nτ. Statistically h is distributed around 2nδ,
which is much smaller than q, and thus able to be identified. The hidden message ω is
obtained according to
ω =
{
0 if h < nτ,
1 if h ≥ nτ, (9)
where τ is the threshold. Determine ω = 1, if there is no value matching within the range,
h < nτ. Sum of difference, h to form Eq. (9) instead of the average S¯n in Eq. (5) is used.
Note that Eq. (9) is equivalent to Eq. (5).
In other words, ω = 0 does not mean that watermark is not embedded. Difference whether
ω = 0 or none can be examined by adopting some optional techniques. One example is that,
137rivacy-Secure Digital W termarki  for Fair Content Trading
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we assign ζ = −1(ω = 0); 1(ω = 1) as
zi =
⎧⎨

xi + δζ if i ∈ A,
xi − δζ if i ∈ B,
xi otherwise,
which is based on Eq. (6). The above modification provides three conditions such as ω = 0,
ω = 1, or none (message is not embedded).
4.1.2 Security
In this section, the security of patchwork watermark is described. First, the embedding key
A and B, the indexes of the modified pixels are uniformly distributed over {1, . . . , ℓ}. The
distribution of (A, B) is illustrated in Fig. 12, where white dots represent (A, B). Hence, it is
almost impossible to attack to determine (A, B) in I ′ without the knowledge of the embedding
key. Second, the property that the original image is not required in an extraction process
improves security against watermark removal due to a leakage of the original image. Third,
since the brightness of some of the pixels has slightly changed, the difference is hardly
perceptible.
Fig. 12. 1-bit Embedded Images and Distribution of A, B
Fig. 12 illustrates an example of a single-bit information being embedded into Lenna (256×256
pixels, 256 gray scale levels) with the parameters of n = 2053, and δ = 3. The SNR for Fig. 12
is 50.6[dB] which is considered to be acceptable.
4.1.3 Optimal parameter
In this section, an optimal parameter δ is described in the sense that the least number of δ with
an accuracy of 95% succeeds in detection.
Let σ′ be standard deviation of n samples of (ai − bi), and σ be standard deviation of the
average value S¯i. Noting the well-known relation of variances, σ = σ
′/
√
n, we can predict
true σ from the sampled σ′. Hence, variance of average Sn decreases as n increases. In other
words, an accuracy of Sn increases along with the increment of n. In order to achieve 95%
confidence for detection, under an assumption of normal distribution, the embedded image
should be shifted by at least 2σ which is identical to δ.
The parameters, average of Sn, µ, standard deviation σ, and optimal δ with respects to n are
demonstrated on Table 4, and the optimal δ given n is obtained from Fig. 13. Note that the
false positive of 5% with the following δ is not sufficient to practical use. In order to make an
38 Applied Cryptography and Network Security
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image more robust, δ could be increased taking consideration of subjective evaluation. For
Fig. 13. Optimal δ Distribution
n µ σ′ σ δ
4613 0.8847 67.4449 0.4769 2
2053 1.9206 67.9670 1.5000 3
1165 -0.4335 68.2865 2.0007 4
757 -1.3805 68.8136 2.5011 5
539 -2.0260 69.7601 3.0048 6
Table 4. Parameters for δ Determination
the sake of determination of δ, we study the relation between the number of modified pairs of
pixels n and quality of an image, which is estimated by means of Signal to Noise Ratio defined
by,
SNR = 10 · log10
2552
MSE2
= 10 · log10
255 · 255
1/ℓ∑(xi − zi)2
, (10)
where MSE is the mean-square error between I and I ′. An image Lenna of 256×256 pixels
is used for this test with the parameters shown in Table 4. Fig. 15 indicates no significant
difference between n = 2053 and n = 4613. This implies the parameter of n > 2053, which
is δ = 3, is the optimal choice to prevent the embedded image from being spoiled, under the
condition that SNR is almost the same. Fig. 14 illustrates how SNR of the image varies for the
image size ℓ, where single-bit is embedded and n = 2053 pixels are manipulated.
4.1.4 Implementation system
In order to estimate a total performance of asymmetric schemes is described below.
Watermark embedding and extracting process for gray scale images are implemented in C,
and cryptographic computations are implemented in Java. Environment specifications are
described in Table 5. An image Lenna I (256× 256 pixels) with a parameter of n = 2053 is used
as a host image.
Based on our implementation, we have estimated embedding time and extracting time.
Description and decryption time of a single bit embedding based on the 1024-bit modified
El Gamal are 0.104 [s], and 0.077 [s], respectively. Those of Paillier encryption are 3.303[s] and
2.127[s].
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Fig. 14. SNR for Different Image Size ℓ
Fig. 15. The Relation between the Number of Modified Pairs of Pixels n and SNR
Detail Specification
CPU Xeon 2.3GHz
OS Redhat 9.0, Linux 2.4.20
Memory 1GB
Encryption Algorithms 1024-bit the modified El Gamal,
1024-bit Paillier
Programming Languages J2SDK 1.4.2, gcc 3.3.3
Table 5. Implementation Environment
4.2 Robustness against noise addition and JPEG compression attacks
The robustness of patchwork watermarking against attacks of “Add Noise” and “JPEG
Compression” using StirMark (Petitcolas, 2000) are evaluated. I ′ originated from Lenna
(256× 256 pixels, 256 gray scale levels), with the parameters of n = 2053, δ = 3, and S¯′n=6.9547.
With this sample image, the parameter of τ=3 for all attacked images I ′ is applied on extraction
process.
In JPEG compression attack, watermark has been successfully extracted up to 80% of JPEG
quality level as shown in Fig. 16. Evaluation result in Add Noise attack is shown in Fig. 16.
40 Applied Cryptography and Network Security
www.intechopen.com
Privacy-Secure Digital Watermarking for Fair Content Trading 17
The noise level represents that of normalized from 0 to 100 such that 0 gives no noise while
100 gives a complete random image.
Fig. 16. Robustness on JPEG Compression and Add Noise Attacks
4.2.1 Comparison between Furukawa’s method and the proposed scheme
Essential difference between Furukawa’s scheme (Furukawa, 2004) and the proposal scheme
comes from the cryptographical primitives, that is, the modified El Gamal and Paillier
encryption. Fig. 17 shows the processing time of an extracting phase in the modified El Gamal
and Paillier encryptions. Processing time for all cases is evaluated. Each of cases is provided
average of ten samples of different seeds. The values used to plot in Fig. 17 are shown in
Table 6.
For the modified El Gamal encryption, the processing time includes decrypting and
identifying process, whereas Paillier encryption includes only decrypting process. The
processing time of the modified El Gamal increases proportionally to n while processing
time of Paillier encryption remains the same since only single decryption process is needed to
extract watermark.
Supposing the processing time follows linearly to n as illustrated in Fig. 17, Paillier processing
time would crosses over that of the modified El Gamal at n∗ = 7403. This result shows that
the scheme (Okada et al., 2008) is superior to Furukawa’s method (Furukawa, 2004) with the
condition when n is less than or equal to n∗.
For the modified El Gamal encryption, it is necessary to examine all possible numbers, which
feasibility is stated in section 4.2.1. Whereas, brute force analysis is not necessary in Paillier
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encryption since exponent can be figured out. Thus, processing cost is the same as encoding
value of base φ in Paillier encryption.
We recall that as n increase, the detection accuracy improves, but the quality of the image
becomes low. According to the section 4.1.3 where we studied the optimal n and δ in terms of
SNR, efficient embedding n is estimated between the number of approximately, 2000 to 5000,
which is less than threshold n∗ = 7403.
Fig. 17. Processing Time of Proposed Scheme and that of (Furukawa, 2004)
n 539 757 1165 2053 4613
Proposed scheme (the modified El Gamal) 5.279 6.475 7.697 9.590 13.47
Furukawa’s scheme (Paillier) 19.11 19.11 19.11 19.11 19.11
Table 6. Processing Time in Watermark Detecting
4.3 Performance summary of pseudo-blind method
In this section, a basic model of practical privacy-secure image trading system based on
pseudo-blind watermark is presented. Abstract of implemented system is described with an
illustration in Fig.19. Image decomposition and watermark algorithms can be substituted
according to the requirement of content trading. The details of image decomposition,
embedding process, and integration process are described in Step 1 through 3 respectively
in Fig. 19. For the implementation, an image of 512 × 512 pixels and 256 gray levels, 11-bit of
ID, and 15-bit ω which includes codeword for ECC are used.
4.3.1 Procedures in the prototype
The procedure of the prototype which mainly contains 3 steps is described below.
4.3.1.1 Verification procedure
A client obtains a pseudonymous ID ID through registration page provided by TTP and then
get verified by a provider. The provider verifies ID in cooperation with TTP by sending ID to
TTP. If verified, TTP returns the verification result to the provider.
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At this point, TTP possesses the client name and the anonymous ID while the provider only
possesses the anonymous ID and purchasing history. Therefore, TTP has difficulty to profile
what kind of image has been purchased while the provider has no clue as to who the client is.
4.3.1.2 Purchasing procedure
The purchasing procedures is described below (Fig. 18). Assume that the client had been
successfully verified anonymously. A client selects an image. Trading procedure which
contains image decomposition and watermark embedding process are executed and then two
decomposed images are generated. The client receives these two images, an endorse piece
and complement piece from TTP and the provider respectively. The images are integrated to
be a complete endorsed image as described later on.
Fig. 18. Purchasing Procedure
4.3.1.3 Trading procedure
The trading procedure is briefly described below. The following instructions can be referred
to Fig. 19. We assume that the client has selected an image.
1. A provider receives HTTP post from a client which contains ID and information of selected
image such as image ID.
2. When the provider receives the data, the selected image is decomposed into a complement
piece (Ic) and an endorse piece Ie as (Ic, Ie) = DCMP(I). Ic is allowed to be accessed by
the client, whereas Ie is allowed to be accessed by TTP. Ie is number of small bc× bc pixels
of blocked images, (Ie1 , . . . , Iebn , bn = (Col/bc× Raw/bc)) as shown in the figure. In this
implementation, bn = 64 = (512/64 × 512/64) of small blocked images are generated
from a 512 × 512 pixels image.
3. The provider returns HTML content as the response to the client. The HTML content
contains links to Ic and Ie. Former one is a single link to Ic while the latter one contains
multiple links to small blocked images (Ie1 , . . . , Ie64). The provider generates a shuffle key
psk in order to send the small blocks to TTP at random order. Ic and psk is sent directly to
the client. Ie is sent to TTP at random order.
4. When TTP receives the blocked images, (Ie1 , . . . , Ie64) from the provider, TTP embeds
watermark ω into the blocked images and then the images are forwarded to the client.
5. The client obtains randomly shuffled Ie from TTP and Ic and psk from the provider by
accessing the links in the HTML content. Finally, the client integrates two images together.
The final step is generating a complete endorsed image by the client as I ′ = INTG(Ic, I ′e) where
INTG(·) is an image integration function.
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4.3.2 Technical detail of the prototype
This scheme is mainly composed of verification, trading, and image integration procedures. In
the verification procedure, a client obtains pseudonymous ID (ID) from TTP. The client begins
trading using ID. A provider verifies ID in cooperation with TTP. If verified, the provider
decompose I into an endorsed part Ie and a complement part Ic and then sends HTML content
to the client (Step 1 in Fig.19). A client accesses the links to obtains Ic and shuffle key psk
from a provider, and then sends request for Ie. Ie is composed of number of divided zCol ×
zRow images. As soon as TTP receives the request, TTP obtains divided Ie in which ω will be
embedded (Step 2 in Fig.19). The client receives endorsed parts I ′e from TTP.
Fig. 19. Trading Procedure
4.3.3 Image decomposition
Image decomposition procedure (step 2 in Fig.19) is described below (Fig.22).
Step 1
FreQuency Decomposition extracts complicated area in an image where watermark is
effectively embedded such as edge of recorded subject using high-pass filtering function
FQD(·). FQD(·) should be applied to an original image in order to extract correct high-pass
component. In other words, if other decomposition elements had been applied before
FQD(·), noise or block border would affect high-pass component extraction. A high-pass
filtered image is generated as IH = FQD(I). Next, the counterpart is generated as IL =
SUB(I, FQD(I)). SUB(·) is subtraction operation of pixel by pixel of two input images. For
example, it subtracts pixels of FQD(I) from those of I. Watermark is effectively embedded
in the complicated area of an image since small manipulation is hardly noticed by human
eyes. For example, brightness modification of single dot in hair area is almost impossible to
recognize the difference, but the modification in skin area is easily recognized. Even though IH
is hardly recognized, detail of an entire figure in the image is somewhat visible. Furthermore,
main component of an image remains in the counterpart IL which may causes re-distribution
of it.
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Step 2
Block Division (BRD(·)), breaks up entire image detail since original condition in IH may
be easily profiled from a high-pass filtered image. BRD(·) is a function which divides an
image into zCol× zRow pixels and outputs two patterns of block-check images as (IHa, IHb) =
BRD(IH). The divided blocks are composed of image elements and blank elements sorted
alternatively as shown in Fig. 20. In this implementation, the image is divided into square
blocks Z1, . . . , Zη which is effective universally. η is the total number of blocks in which 64
(64 = η = 512/64 × 512/64) blocks such that Z1, . . . , Z64 is generated where zCol = zRow =
64.
Fig. 20. Block-check Image Generation
Step 3
In order to make a valueless image, Invisible Masking function IVM(·) is used to add
noise as ILn = IVM(IL) so that the client has no incentive to redistribute Ic without
receiving Ie. IVM(·) adds up brightness values as noise in nCol × nRow pixels for all area
Nj, (1 ≤ j ≤ (Col/nCol × Row/nRow)). Pseudo-random value rndj used for noise (block
noise) is generated based on minimum brightness of Nj because an input image IL should
be generated by simply summing up the brightness values of block noise image ILn and
the counterpart SUB(IL, ILn) (Fig. 21). For example, assume the brightness in Nj in IL is
120,96,209,58, rndj in ILn is 200, the brightness to be assigned to counterpart SUB(IL, ILn)
would be (120-200),(96-200),(209-200),(58-200). Note that since negative integer is invalid for
brightness, the pseudo-random value needs to be generated within the range of 1, . . . , 58
in order to avoid underflow and overflow when summing up two values together. In this
implementation nCol = nRow = 4 is used. Block noise should be effective for this case since
block noise is able to well conceal recorded subjects compare to every pixel wise noise. If
the pixel is large, the subject is concealed well, but it affects watermark embedding due to
reduction of feature in the image.
Step 4
Generate the other parts of block-check images as (ILna, ILnb) = BRD(ILn). The image element
of which will be replaced with the blank parts in IHa. ILnb will be used.
Step 5
Block Integration (BI(·)) integrates image elements in ILnb and IHa as ILnbHa = BI(ILnb, IHa)
which contains frequency components and noise components.
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Fig. 21. Noise Generation
Step 6
Generate a complement part Ic = SUB(I, (ILnbHa)).
Step 7
Shuffle blocks in ILnbHa by using block shuffling function RS(·) to generate an endorse part Ie
and a key psk for reversing shuffle as (Ie, psk) = RS(ILnbHa).
Fig. 22. Image Decomposition Procedure
4.3.4 Watermark embedding
In this section, embedding process is described (Step 2 in Fig. 19). As soon as TTP receives a
request from a client, TTP obtains blocked images Ie = Z1, . . . , Zη at random to embed ω.
In this prototype, we apply a watermark algorithm that embeds watermark in frequency
domain. Ie contains two types of blocks, a high-pass filtered block Zh and a noise block Zn.
This embedding, effective for high-pass filtered blocks, is applied to Zh.
Parameters for embedding are summarized below. Let robustness of watermark is δ, pairs
of coefficients used for embedding are ai, bi, bit string of ω is ωi, the index of ai, bi and ωi is
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i = 1, . . . , q, bit length of ω is q, redundancy (number of Y to be modified) of ω is γ. In this
implementation, q = 15, γ = 30, δ = 20, bCol = bRow = 8 (ths size of Yℓ) is used.
First, finds out small blocks Yℓ in a blocked image that contains complicated area where
watermark is effectively embedded. In this implementation, standard deviation is used to
estimate complexity because standard deviation σ of brightness tends to be large in the
complicated area in general. Ordinary images shown in the section 4.4 are used in this
implementation. Hence, the block Yℓ which contain large σ provides better detection accuracy
of watermark. First, divide Z into area Yℓ which is bCol × bRow pixels. Find σ from every Yℓ.
Next, find Yℓ that satisfies σ > τ. τ, threshold for complexity, is the average value of σ in all
Yℓ in this implementation.
Embedding procedure is described below (Fig. 23). Select q pairs of DCT coefficient
a1, . . . , aq, b1, . . . , bq from the selected area Yℓ to embed watermark ω1, . . . ,ωq.
ai is selected from low to middle frequency domain, bi is selected from middle to high
frequency domain. For embedding ωi = 0, the coefficients are modified as ai < bi, and
for ωi = 1, these are modified as ai ≥ bi. If ωi = 0 and the selected coefficients are ai < bi,
then the coefficients are modified to satisfy as a′i = ai − δ, b′i = bi + δ. Otherwise (ai ≥ bi),
the coefficients are modified as a′i = bi − δ, b′i = ai + δ. If ωi = 1 and ai ≥ bi, a′i = ai + δ,
b′i = bi − δ. Otherwise (ai ≤ bi), they are modified as a′i = bi + δ, b′i = ai − δ. Apply the above
modification to all i = 1, . . . , q.
If δ is large, watermark would be robust, but the image would be degenerated. If δ is small,
an image get less degenerated, but watermark would be fragile.
Adding δ causes overflow when integrating two images. However, if the pixels would be
larger than 255, we make the brightness in 255.
Fig. 23. Coefficients Selection in a block Y
Iterate the above process to all Y1, . . . , Yγ which satisfy σ > τ. Note that, if γ is large,
watermark can be robust, but the image would be degenerated.
Apply the above procedure for all high-pass blocks Z to generate endorsed blocks
Z′1, . . . , Z
′
η/2. Note that total number of Z
′ is η/2 since high-pass blocks Z and noise blocks Z
exist the equal amount in I ′ in this implementation.
An extraction method is described below. Extraction requires the information on modified
coefficients. Deploy the endorsed image I ′ into frequency domain as embedding procedure.
First, divides the image into Z and then extract ω = ω1, . . . ,ωq by examining the condition
of DCT coefficients (a′1, b
′
1), (a
′
2, b
′
2), . . . , (a
′
q, b
′
q) in Y
′
1, . . . , Y
′
γ in every Z
′ respectively. Next,
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extracts ω from Y′1, . . . , Y
′
γ and then apply this process for all Z
′
1, . . . , Z
′
η/2 to take an average
of extracted bit stream.
4.3.5 Obtaining endorsed image
In the final step (Step 3 in Fig. 19), a complete endorsed image I ′ is generated by integrating Ic
and I ′e which can be obtained by tracing links in the HTML content. The client obtains Ic and
psk from a provider, and I ′e = RS(I ′LnbHa) from TTP.
I ′ is generated by following process. Reverse shuffle by I ′LnbHa = RS
−1
psk(I
′
e) and then combine
with Ic as I
′ = SUM(Ic, I ′LnbHa) where SUM(·) is function that sum up brightness values
of two input images. Note that a provider cannot obtain I ′ illegally because verification is
required to obtain I ′e.
4.4 Evaluation
Perceptual and robustness evaluations are shown in this section. The former one shows
perceptual condition of decomposed images and a watermarked image. In the latter
one, robustness of watermark is shown. The environment used in this implementation is
summarized in Table 7.
Detail Specification
CPU Intel Xeon E5345 2.33GHz
Memory 4GB RAM
OS Fedora 10
DCMP, EMB Matlab2009a
Web interface INTG HTML, PHP
Table 7. Environment
Attacks Description Total Attacks Levels Succeed
AFFINE Affine transform 8 1, 2, . . . , 8 None
CONV Gaussian filtering 2 1, 2 All
CROP [%] Cropping 3 25, 50, 75 None
JPEG[%] JPEG compression 7 20, 30, . . . , 80 30, . . . , 80
MEDIAN Median cut 4 3, 5, 7, 9 3
NOISE[%] Add noise 8 10, 20, . . . , 80 None
RESC [%] Rescale 6 50, 75, 90, 125, 150, 200 All
RML [lines] Remove lines 9 10, 20, . . . , 100 All
Table 8. Parameters of StirMark and Evaluated Results
4.4.1 Perceptual evaluation
Perceptual evaluation for decomposition using various types of images is shown in Fig. 24
(From top to bottom; Baboon, Book, Granada, Kyufun, and Peppers). Note that Baboon and Peppers
are provided by USC SIPI database. The other images are prepared by the authors.
An watermarked image I ′ is shown in Fig. 25 in which high strength-level of watermark has
been applied to show distinct embedding effects. Therefore, I ′ is heavily degenerated.
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Original Image I Complement piece Ic Endorse piece Ie
Fig. 24. Various Types of Output Images
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4.4.2 Robustness evaluation of watermark using StirMark benchmark
Parameters on StirMark used in this implementation is listed in Table 8. For example of
AFFINE, 8 levels of affine transformed images are generated. Robustness is examined by
extracting ω from transformed images.
Evaluation results are shown below. Watermark is detected from 24 images out of 47 attacked
images as shown in Table 8, labeled as “Succeed.” We also show how a watermarked image
is affected by decomposition. We have compared robustness of two watermarked images in
which combination of embedding and decomposition and the one without decomposition
have been applied. The latter one, the one without decomposition shows 31/47 cases are
successfully extracted. The comparison of the two methods is shown in Fig. 26. Black lines
show robustness of a watermarked image embedded with decomposition, and gray lines
show the one without decomposition. The experimental results provide effective evidence
showing that robustness of a watermarked image is little affected by decomposition.
Fig. 25. Original Image I and Endorsed Image I ′
Fig. 26. Robustness of Watermark
5. Conclusion
Our primal consideration is that most of the security applications or tools are difficult to use
in which special skill, knowledge and tools are needed. However, majority of the people is
not capable of understanding programming or special mean of computer term. Although, the
Internet becomes popular commodity, security tool is way behind to be commodity. Practical
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and secure watermarking is urgently needed. A fair and secure digital content trading scheme
that protects both provider’s and client’s security is introduced in this chapter.
Blind watermarking based on cryptography and watermarking is one of the effective
techniques in which performance evaluation is introduced based on our implementation.
This satisfies higher level of security at heavy processing cost because cryptography is not
compatible with watermarking. Performance evaluation which shows feasibility of blind
watermarking is introduced.
Pseudo-blind watermarking (Okada et al., 2009) which uses media processing instead of
cryptography is an alternative method of the blind watermarking. This scheme enhances
security and compatibility of watermarking. Performance evaluation is also introduced. This
scheme is able to resolve the problems of blind watermarking which are robustness and
processing cost.
Even though security tools have been developed, most of them are still difficult to use for
ordinary people. However, our concern is that providing user-friendly security tools enables
to enhance entire security level because if more people use security tools, entire security level
would be increased rather than providing absolute security level to only certain people who
has high literacy to use security tools. One of our future work (Okada et al., 2011), intuitive
watermark extraction is designed for people who have no knowledge nor skill is proposed
toward user-friendly digital watermarking.
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